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This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of cross-state externalities associated with
gun regulations in the context of the gun trafficking market. Using gun tracing data, which identify
the source state for crime guns recovered in destination states, we find that firearms in this market
tend to flow from states with weak gun laws to states with strict gun laws, satisfying a necessary condition
for the existence of cross-state externalities in the theoretical model. We also find an important role
for transportation costs in this market, with gun flows more significant between nearby states; this
finding suggests that externalities are spatial in nature. Finally, we present evidence that criminal possession
of guns is higher in states exposed to weak gun laws in nearby states.
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A key issue in the design of federations involves the delegation of authority between national,
state, and local governments. A common argument against decentralization hinges on the
idea that localities may fail to internalize cross-jurisdiction externalities. Under centraliza-
tion by contrast, political institutions may help to internalize these externalities. A key
argument in favor of decentralization, by contrast, involves diversity in preferences, which
can be better accommodated under decentralization by tailoring policies according to local
preferences.1
This paper examines these issues, cross-state externalities and heterogeneous policies, in
the context of gun policy in the United States. While the federal government has enacted
several gun-related policies, states are also heavily involved in this policy arena, with ap-
proximately 300 state laws in place as of 1999 (Ludwig and Cook, 2003). Thus, gun policy
is largely decentralized in the United States, and, re￿ecting the signi￿cant heterogeneity in
preferences, there is signi￿cant diversity in gun restrictions across states.
In response to federal and state restrictions on gun purchases, a secondary market in
guns has emerged. In this market, gun tra￿ckers supply guns to prohibited persons, those
who cannot, according to federal law, purchase ￿rearms from a licensed gun dealer; this
group includes convicted felons and minors.2 This market is substantial in size, with
ATF investigations into tra￿cking between July 1996 and December 1998 identifying over
84,000 ￿rearms that were diverted into this secondary market (ATF, 2000). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that this secondary market is characterized by large price markups and
has a signi￿cant interstate component, with one tra￿cker reporting buying guns on the
legal market in Virginia, which has relatively weak gun laws, for $150-200 and re-selling
them illegally in New York, which has relatively strict gun laws, for $500-600.3 If the
interstate ￿ow of guns responds to di￿erences in state-level regulations, then gun laws may
1 Among others, see Oates (1972), Oates (1999), Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a), Besley and Coate (1999),
and Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002). In the context of anti-trust policy, see Inman and Rubinfeld
(1997b), who focus on the trade-o￿ between economic e￿ciency and political participation.
2 See Cook et. al. (2007) for a discussion of this market in the city of Chicago, Illinois.
3 Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2008).
1have signi￿cant cross-state externalities.4
Thus, gun policy in the United States seems to re￿ect the costs associated with decen-
tralization, namely cross-state externalities, and these externalities are particularly salient
when there is signi￿cant diversity in gun regulations across states. In this paper, we provide
a theoretical and empirical investigation of these issues. As motivated by our tracing data,
which provide information on the source state for crime guns recovered in for each of the 50
states, we begin by building a simple supply and demand model of cross-state gun tra￿ck-
ing. On the supply side, potential tra￿ckers in a destination state choose whether or not to
tra￿c guns, and, conditional on doing so, must choose the source state for purchase. The
choice of source state depends upon gun regulations, which increase the cost of tra￿cking
from these states, and transport costs, which are increasing in the distance between the
source and the destination state. On the demand side, criminals in the destination state
decide, given a price, whether or not to purchase a gun. The key prediction of the model is
that increasing the stringency of gun laws in a given source state increases prices and reduces
transactions in the secondary market in other states, leading to interstate externalities. A
necessary condition for the existence of these cross-state externalities is that tra￿cking pat-
terns respond to di￿erences in state-level gun regulations. In addition, given that the model
includes transportation costs, any externalities are larger in magnitude when the destination
and source state are in close proximity.
Our empirical analysis uses tracing data, as described above, to construct a 50-state gun
tra￿cking import-export matrix. Using these data, our primary empirical analysis is based
upon a supply-side analysis in which we condition on a tra￿cker’s decision to sell guns in a
given destination state. In particular, our empirical speci￿cation, which is derived from the
theoretical model and is similar to a gravity trade model, relates trade ￿ows between a pair
of states to the di￿erences in the stringency of gun laws between those states.5 Consistent
with the predictions derived from the model, we ￿nd that guns ￿ow from states to weak gun
4 Indeed, policy-makers in restrictive states have argued that tra￿cking increases criminal access to guns
in their states and have attempted to restrict this source of ￿rearms. Mayor Bloomberg, for example, recently
￿led a lawsuit against 15 gun dealers in states with weak gun laws after identifying these dealers as sources
of crime guns recovered in New York City.
5 For a review of the literature in international trade on the gravity model, see Anderson (2011).
2laws to nearby states with strict gun laws. Thus, the necessary condition for the existence
of cross-state externalities is satis￿ed. Building upon this supply-side analysis, we then
incorporate a proxy for criminal possession of guns and conduct an equilibrium analysis,
which accounts for both the supply side and the demand side. While this analysis requires a
number of additional assumptions, it has the advantage of allowing one to quantify the size
of any externalities. The results from this analysis suggest externalities are signi￿cant, with
weak gun laws being associated with high possession rates by criminals in nearby states.
Finally, we examine an alternative indicator for tra￿cking based upon time-to-crime.
The paper proceeds as follows. We ￿rst present background information on relevant
federal and state gun laws. We then describe the relevant literature on guns, gun tra￿cking,
and cross-state externalities. As motivated by our tracing data, we then build a simple
supply and demand model of gun tra￿cking. After describing the data, we then explain the
econometric strategy, present the results, and conduct several counterfactual experiments.
The conclusion summarizes the results and describes the associated policy implications.
2 Background on gun laws
The Gun Control Act of 1968 is arguably the most signi￿cant federal gun control legislation.
Among other things, this law requires dealers to have a license, restricts purchases by pro-
hibited persons, including felons and minors, and generally prohibits the interstate sale of
￿rearms. The Brady Bill, passed in 1994, requires dealers to conduct background checks and
thus provides an enforcement mechanism for restricting purchases by prohibited persons.
States supplement these federal laws in a variety of ways. For the purposes of this study,
which is focused on cross-state gun tra￿cking, we consider ten laws deemed signi￿cant in
terms of restricting tra￿cking, as identi￿ed by Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010). These
ten laws are detailed in Table 1A. The ￿rst law parallels federal laws on straw purchasing
and thus provides an additional enforcement mechanism. Straw purchasers are individuals
who purchase a gun on behalf of someone else, who is often either a prohibited person or
a gun tra￿cker. The next two laws also parallel federal laws and involve either purchasers
who falsify information or dealers who do not conduct the required checks. Fourth, some
states also have attempted to close the gun show loophole, under which infrequent sellers are
3not required to conduct background checks. Fifth, some states require prospective gun pur-
chasers to ￿rst acquire a permit to own a ￿rearm, and the application process for this permit
typically involves a background check. Sixth, some states allow local authorities discretion
to deny concealed carry permits, which are available in some form in every state except
Illinois and Wisconsin. Seventh, while convicted felons cannot purchase ￿rearms under fed-
eral laws, some states extend this to include those individuals with violent misdemeanors on
their record. Eighth, some states require individuals to report lost or stolen guns, attempting
to counter the fact that many tra￿ckers allegedly report that their guns have been stolen
after investigations have traced a crime gun back to them. Ninth, some states allow local
governments to pass ￿rearms restrictions, whereas localities are preempted from doing so in
other states. Tenth, some states supplement ATF inspections of gun dealers. See Mayors
Against Illegal Guns (2010) for additional information on these state gun laws.
To provide a sense of the cross-state variation in gun regulations, Figure 1 maps an
index of state gun laws based upon the total number, from zero to ten, of these gun laws in
place, where darker shading indicates more stringent gun laws. As shown, there is signi￿cant
regional variation, with southern and mountain states tending to have weak gun laws, and
with states in the upper Midwest and on the two coasts tending to have stricter gun laws.
Despite this regional variation, many state borders are associated with signi￿cant changes
in gun laws, creating potentially strong incentives for gun tra￿cking. Illinois, for example,
has 8 out of the 10 laws described above and is bordered by three states, Indiana, Missouri,
and Wisconsin, with relatively weak gun laws.
As an alternative measure, we also consider an index of laws identi￿ed by the Brady
Campaign (2009) as key in curbing ￿rearms tra￿cking. In particular, the Center has assigned
a score to each of 11 laws, with a maximum total of 29 points.6 These laws, as detailed
in Table 1B, are focused on regulating dealers, while the laws identi￿ed by Mayors Against
Illegal Guns are more focused on consumers.
6 While the original index allows up to 35 points, no states had enacted one of the laws, which increased
the score by 6 points.
43 Related Literature
The existing literature on gun tra￿cking within the United States is, similarly to this paper,
largely based upon crime gun tracing data. Webster, Vernick, and Hepburn (2001) examine
data on guns recovered in 25 U.S. cities and ￿nd that cities in states with mandatory regis-
tration and licensing systems tended to import more guns from other states. They also ￿nd
that cities in proximity to states without these laws also tended to import more guns. Cook
and Braga (2001) analyze tracing data for guns recovered in Chicago, where background
checks were already being conducted prior to 1994, and ￿nd a large reduction in guns im-
ported from Brady states, those that were not conducting background checks prior to 1994,
after the passage of the Brady Bill. In a study focused on intrastate tra￿cking, Webster,
Vernick, and Bulzacchelli (2009) ￿nd that enhanced regulation and oversight of dealers and
private transactions is associated with a reduction in gun tra￿cking. The tracing data used
in this paper are based upon a study by Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010). Their key
￿nding is that states with weak gun laws tend to export more guns than states with stricter
gun laws.
We build upon this literature in several ways. Most importantly, by building a theoretical
model of gun tra￿cking, we provide micro-foundations for measurement. In particular, the
theoretical model generates an econometric speci￿cation that is based upon correlating trade
￿ows between a given pair of states with the di￿erence in the stringency of gun laws between
this pair of states. To the extent that tra￿ckers respond to gun laws, then ￿rearms should
￿ow from states with weak laws to states with strict laws. The existing literature, by
contrast, has tended to focus on aggregate, jurisdiction-level data. As noted above, for
example, Webster, Vernick, and Hepburn (2001) document that cities with strict laws tend
to import more than cities with weak laws. By not analyzing the source states associated
with these imports, however, their test cannot establish that these imports are from states
with weak gun laws, as opposed to being from states with strict gun laws. Thus, their results
do not establish that tra￿ckers respond to di￿erences in gun laws across states. Similarly,
Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010) ￿nd that states with weak gun laws tend to export more
than states with strict gun laws. By not analyzing the destination states associated with
these exports, however, their test cannot establish that these exports are made to states
5with strict gun laws, as opposed to being made states with weak gun laws. Given this, their
results do not establish that tra￿ckers respond to di￿erences in gun laws across states.
In addition to focusing on trade ￿ows, our study makes several other contributions to
the literature. We highlight spatial considerations, focusing on the idea that externalities
are potentially more signi￿cant between nearby states than between more distant states.7
By developing an econometric model from micro-foundations, our analysis also allows us
to conduct several counterfactuals relating to reductions in incentives for gun tra￿cking.
Finally, in addition to analyzing tracing data, we also examine the e￿ects of gun tra￿cking
on the possession of guns by criminals.8
There is also a related literature on the tra￿cking of weapons at the international level.
DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) detect increases in stock prices for arms companies in high
corruption countries under an embargo following an increase in con￿ict in other countries.
This result is consistent with the illegal trading of arms by these companies. Two recent
papers examine gun tra￿cking and violence between the United States and Mexico. Dube,
Dube, and Garc￿ ￿a-Ponce (2011) exploit the expiration of the assault weapons ban in the
United States during 2004. While California had a state-level ban that made the expiration
irrelevant, Arizona and New Mexico did not. The authors show that, relative to California,
gun crime in areas in Mexico close to Arizona and New Mexico experienced large increases in
gun violence. Chicoine (2011) conducts a similar analysis, in which he compares violence in
areas in Mexico with a cartel presence to violence in areas without a cartel presence, before
7 Given our focus on spatial considerations and transportation costs, our paper is also related to a
literature on cross-border shopping in other policy contexts. Recent contributions include Doyle and Sam-
phantharak (2008) on gasoline taxes, Lovenheim (2008) on cigarettes, and Knight and Schi￿ (2010) on lottery
games. In a study using an empirical strategy similar to that using gun tracing data, Merriman (2010) uses
tax stamps on cigarette packs discarded in the city of Chicago and ￿nds that tax rates help to explain the
geographic distribution of tax stamps.
8 Given our use of crime data, our paper is also related to a large literature on guns, gun policy, and
crime. Lott and Mustard (1997) and Lott (1998) ￿nd that concealed carry laws have led to a reduction in
violent crime. Duggan (2001) uses information on the geographic circulation of a popular ￿rearms magazine
as a proxy for gun ownership and ￿nds that guns tend to increase crime. Ludwig and Cook (2000) examine
trends in crime rates in states with and without background checks prior to the passage of the Brady bill
and ￿nd that background checks had little or no e￿ects on homicides. Cook and Ludwig (2003) provide
evidence that increased gun ownership leads to increased burglary rates. Duggan, Hjalmarsson, and Jacob
(2011) ￿nd no relationship between gun shows and subsequent crime rates in the states of California and
Texas.
6and after the expiration of the assault weapons ban. The results of this analysis also suggest
that the availability of assault weapons in the United States increases crime in Mexico.
4 Model of Gun Tra￿cking
This section develops a simple equilibrium model of interstate gun tra￿cking. Given our em-
pirical motivation, we keep the model simple and make speci￿c functional form assumptions
in many cases. It should be clear, however, that the results are robust to other modeling
assumptions.
Consider a set of states. In a given destination state d, there is a pool of N potential
tra￿ckers, which are indexed by t. Tra￿ckers supply guns to criminals in d and can purchase
domestically (gtd = d), purchase from another source state (gtd = s 6= d), or not purchase
(gtd = 0). The non-travel costs associated with purchasing from source state s is given by
￿￿ + ￿rs ￿ ￿Xs ￿ ￿s, where rs indexes the stringency of the regulatory policy in s; the
parameter ￿, which is hypothesized to be positive, re￿ects the sensitivity of these costs
to the regulatory policy, and Xs and ￿s capture observed and unobserved, respectively,
cost di￿erences across states. Travel costs, which equal zero for domestic purchases, are
represented by the increasing function h(tds), where tds represents travel distance. With an
additional idiosyncratic component "tds, a purchase of a gun in source state s by a tra￿cker
that is re-sold in d at a price of Pd yields a surplus equal to:
Vtds = ￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿rs + ￿Xs ￿ h(tds) + ￿s + "tds (1)
where ￿; which is hypothesized to be positive, captures the responsiveness of tra￿ckers
to the price in destination state d. The payo￿ to a tra￿cker from not purchasing a gun
is normalized to equal Vtd0 = "td0: If "tds is distributed type-I extreme value, then the
probability of a tra￿cker t from destination state d purchasing in source state s equals:
Pr(gtd = s) =




exp(￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿rk + ￿Xk ￿ h(tdk) + ￿k)
(2)
In terms of the demand size, we assume a pool of n criminals, indexed by c; in destination
state d. Criminal c is willing to pay "cd for a gun, which follows the distribution function
7F and density f. Thus, given a price Pd; the aggregate demand for guns in state equals
n[1 ￿ F(Pd)]:
In equilibrium, prices are set such that the aggregate supply of guns to d from all possible








exp(￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿rk + ￿Xk ￿ h(tdk) + ￿k)
= n[1 ￿ F(Pd)] (3)
where N is the number of tra￿ckers on the supply side and n is the number of criminals on
the demand side.
Then, considering an increase in the stringency of gun policies in a given source state s,




￿ Pr(gtd = s)Pr(gtd = 0)






￿nf(Pd)￿ Pr(gtd = s)Pr(gtd = 0)
￿Pr(gtd = 0)Pr(gtd 6= 0) + n
Nf(Pd)
(5)
where Qd is the equilibrium quantity in destination state d: As shown, under the hypothesized
signs of the parameters, increasing the stringency of gun laws in source state s leads to an
increase in the equilibrium price and a decrease in the equilibrium quantity in the secondary
market in state d . Thus, a necessary condition for such cross-state externalities in gun
policies is that tra￿ckers respond to di￿erences in gun laws across states (￿ > 0). Given
this, the main focus of the empirical analysis involves estimation of the sign and magnitude
of this parameter ￿:
The model also highlights the role of travel distance in these policy externalities. In
particular, we have that the ratio of domestic responses to foreign policy changes (s 6= d),






= ￿￿(rs ￿ rd) + ￿(Xs ￿ Xd) ￿ h(tds) (6)
Thus, under the assumption that travel costs are increasing in travel distance, cross-state
externalities, when considered relative to the domestic e￿ects of policies, are more signi￿cant
8when the two states under consideration are in close proximity. Thus, an additional focus
of the empirical analysis involves the role of distance in trade ￿ows.
Given the importance of the parameter governing the responsiveness of supply to gun
laws (￿) and travel distances, our primary empirical analysis focuses on the supply side via
an examination of the ￿ow of guns across states in tracing data. In addition to estimating
these key parameters, the supply-side analysis allows us to measure the degree to which
state gun laws are weakened by tra￿cking resulting from weak gun laws in other states.
Supplementing this analysis, we then attempt to measure criminal possession of guns, which
can be considered as a proxy of equilibrium quantities. This allows us to estimate both
supply-side and demand-side parameters and to thus quantify the externalities associated
with weak gun laws in other states increasing criminal possession of guns, as highlighted in
equation 5.
5 Data and Selection Issues
To shed light on the cross-state externalities associated with gun tra￿cking, our main data
source involves information from crime gun tracing. Although the raw data are not publicly
available, the ATF recently released state-level aggregate data for the calender year 2009,
and these data were subsequently posted on the website www.tracetheguns.org. For a given
destination state, these data include the number of guns recovered from crime scenes that
were successfully traced to a given source state. Thus, using these data, one can construct
the full 50-state gun tra￿cking import-export matrix, with about one-third of traced guns
originally purchased in other states. Our analysis excludes Hawaii and Alaska but includes
the District of Columbia and is thus based upon 49 source and 49 destination states, for a
total of 2,401 trade ￿ow observations. In total, about one-third of these traced guns were
purchased in other states, suggesting that cross-state externalities are signi￿cant.
There are three important selection issues associated with interpreting these tracing data
as representative of the pool of guns possessed by criminals. First, not all guns involved in
crimes are recovered by the police. One important implication of this is that crimes involving
weapons, which are recovered by de￿nition, are likely to be over-represented. Indeed, as
shown in Appendix Table 1, weapons o￿enses represent the largest category, and, within
9this category, over two-thirds of weapons o￿enses involve possession crimes. While one could
argue that possession crimes are victimless and that there are no cross-state externalities in
these cases, there is substantial evidence that those charged with possession crimes represent
individuals who are at-risk for criminal activity in general. Indeed, Burruss and Decker
(2002) conduct a qualitative analysis of police records involving weapons o￿enses and ￿nd
that these violations often occur under violent circumstances. In addition, Bureau of Justice
Statistics (2006) reports that, among felony defendants facing weapons charges in large
urban counties during 2006, 80 percent of had at least one prior arrest and 65 percent at
least one prior conviction.9 Statistics from New York City also show that those convicted
of felony gun possession, when compared to other felons, were more likely to be re-arrested,
their re-arrests were more likely to involve violence, and they were four times more likely to
be arrested for homicide.10 Finally, the tracing procedure only allows local police to list
a single type of crime. It is possible that many weapons charges were made simultaneously
with other charges, and it is natural that police submitting the trace request would list the
weapons charge, rather than the other crime.
The second selection issue involves the fact that tracing policies vary across jurisdictions,
with some jurisdictions submitting all guns recovered for tracing, and others submitting guns
only for investigative purposes. One important implication of this second selection issue is
that some jurisdictions in states with strict gun laws may ￿rst check state-level records, such
as purchaser permit databases, before submitting their tracing requests to the ATF. This
may lead to states with strict gun laws having an arti￿cially high number of out-of-state
traces. As described below, we address this concern by including destination state ￿xed
e￿ects in one of our speci￿cations, and, in this case, the model is identi￿ed solely by the
distribution of out-of-state traces and the associated gun laws across source states.
The third selection issue involves the fact that not all guns submitted for tracing are
9 While these statistics are based upon felony defendants, individuals may also be charged
with misdemeanor o￿enses. According to arrests data from the state of California during 2009,
however, there were 5,771 misdemeanor weapons arrests and 23,908 felony weapons arrests [see
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc stats/prof09/index.htm]. Thus, 19 percent of weapons-related arrests were mis-
demeanors and 81 percent were felonies. While these data are limited to as single state, they do suggest
that weapons charges are not dominated by misdemeanor o￿enses.
10 See http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/local/gun-o￿ender.shtml.
10successfully traced to a source state. In 2009, of the roughly 240,000 guns that were sub-
mitted for tracing, only 145,000, or 60 percent, were successfully traced. There are a variety
of reasons why a gun may not be traced. First, dealers are only required to keep records for
20 years. Second, in some cases, the serial number on the gun has been obliterated. While
we do not have any systematic information on guns that were not successfully traced, there
were not signi￿cant discrepancies between states in terms of the fraction of guns that were
successfully traced (Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2010).
We supplement these tracing data with information on state gun laws. Our baseline
estimates are based upon an index of 10 guns laws, as described above, in Mayors Against
Illegal Guns (2010), and we also estimate speci￿cations in which we allow for each law to have
an independent e￿ect. To capture the importance of spatial proximity, as suggested by the
model, we also incorporate information on the distance between every state, as measured by
the number of miles between the geographic centroids of the two states. As control variables,
we also include measures of state size, in terms of both square miles and population.
6 Supply Side Analysis
Our primary empirical analysis focuses on role of state gun laws in the ￿ow of guns across
states. This analysis tests the simple prediction of the model that tra￿cking ￿ows between
any two states depend upon gun laws in the source state, gun laws in the destination state,
and the proximity of the two states.
Since these tracing data do not include information on non-purchases, this analysis fo-
cuses exclusively on the supply side and the corresponding theoretical probability that, con-
ditional on supplying a gun to state d (gcd 6= 0), a tra￿cker in destination state d purchases
a gun from source state s. This is given by:
Pr(gtd = sjgtd 6= 0) =
exp(￿￿rs ￿ h(tds) + ￿Xs + ￿s + ￿ds)
X
k
exp(￿￿rk ￿ h(tdk) + ￿Xk + ￿k + ￿dk)
(7)
Note that, since this analysis is conditioned on the decision by a tra￿cker to supply a gun
to state d, these key expressions are independent of the price of guns (Pd) in state d. This is
helpful from our perspective as we are not aware of any systematic state-level data on prices
11in this market.
For empirical purposes, we parameterize travel costs as h(tdk) = ￿1(tdk > 0)+￿tdk ￿￿dk:
The ￿rst term applies only to out-of-state purchases and is intended to capture potential
exposure to federal gun laws when re-selling guns across state lines. The second term captures
the increase in travel costs associated with increases in travel distance. Finally, ￿dk captures
unobserved costs associated with tra￿cking guns between states s and k.
Then, letting mds denote the imports from s from d; as represented in the tracing data,
assuming a su￿ciently large sample of recovered guns, we have that:
mds=mdd = Pr(gtd = sjgtd 6= 0)=Pr(gtd = djgtd 6= 0) (8)
Combining equations (7) and (8) and taking logs, we then have the key estimating equation:
ln(mds) ￿ ln(mdd) = ￿￿ ￿ ￿(rs ￿ rd) ￿ ￿tds + ￿(Xs ￿ Xd) + (￿s ￿ ￿d) + (￿ds ￿ ￿dd) (9)
As shown, under the hypothesis that ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0, the ￿ow of guns from source state s to
destination state d (mds); relative to in-state purchases (mdd); is increasing in the stringency
of gun laws in the destination state, is decreasing in the stringency of gun laws in the source
state, and is decreasing in the distance between the source and destination states. Finally,
the constant in this regression, which is based upon a comparison of foreign sources to
domestic sources, identi￿es ￿; which is the cost associated with importing guns from any
state, relative to in-state purchases.
Table 2 present our preliminary results from estimation of equation (9) via OLS. In
particular, we regress the left-hand side of (9) on distance, in thousands of kilometers, and
the di￿erence in the stringency index between the source and destination states. Since the
original index varies between 0 and 10, this di￿erence varies between ￿10 and 10. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of both source and destination state.11
As shown in column 1, the di￿erence between the source and destination stringency index
has the expected sign, with increasing stringency in the source state leading to reduced trade
￿ows and increasing stringency in the destination state leading to increased trade ￿ows, and
11 We have also estimated speci￿cations with two-way random e￿ects (at both the destination-state and
source-state level), and the results are similar to those in Table 2.
12this coe￿cient is statistically signi￿cant at the 99-percent level. Also, the distance between
the two states has the expected coe￿cient, with increases in distance associated with a
reduction in trade ￿ows, and this coe￿cient is again statistically signi￿cant. In terms of
comparing these two key coe￿cients, an increase in the stringency index of one point (i.e.
one additional law) in the destination state is equivalent to moving the source state closer
by about 230 kilometers. In terms of the other control variables, larger states, in terms of
population, are more likely to export and less likely to import. We ￿nd no corresponding
relationship in terms of state square miles. Finally, the constant is negative and statistically
signi￿cant, highlighting the fact that around two-thirds of all traced guns were originally
sold in the destination state.
While the regression in column 1 restricts source and destination laws to have equal
and opposite e￿ects, the speci￿cation in column 2 relaxes this restriction. As shown, the
two coe￿cients have the hypothesized signs, with increases in the source stringency index
reducing trade ￿ows and increases in the destination stringency index increasing trade ￿ows.
In column 3, we relax the assumption that every law in the index of 10 laws has the same
e￿ect.12 As shown, the laws that have the hypothesized negative e￿ect include straw
purchaser liability, required reporting of lost or stolen guns, and local discretion over gun
regulations.
6.1 Additional speci￿cations
The baseline speci￿cation, as reported in Table 2, is identi￿ed by two distinct sources of
variation. First, to the extent that gun laws matter, then states with strict gun laws should
purchase less domestically and import more from other states. That is, the key coe￿cient on
gun laws is identi￿ed in part by the correlation between destination state gun laws (rd) and
the propensity to purchase domestically (mdd): Second, to the extent that gun laws matter,
then, all else equal, a given destination state should import more from states with weak
gun laws. That is, the key coe￿cient on gun laws is identi￿ed in part by the correlation
between source state gun laws (rs) and the propensity to import from that state (mds): Since,
12 Each of these laws is measured as source less destination and thus takes on three possible values (￿1,
0, and 1).
13as noted above, not all crime guns are submitted for tracing, it could be that states with
strict gun laws ￿rst check state-level databases before submitting a gun for tracing, and this
may induce an arti￿cial correlation between destination-state gun laws and the propensity
to purchase domestically. Given this, we next present a speci￿cation with destination state
￿xed e￿ects. By subsuming all variation that is constant at the level of the destination state,
this speci￿cation is identi￿ed solely by the second source of variation described above. That
is, this analysis is identi￿ed solely by the distribution of out-of-state traces across source
states. As shown in Table 3, which reports results from a ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation, the
results are broadly similar to those in Table 2, with states importing more from other states
with weak gun laws than from other states with strict gun laws. Similarly, as shown in
column 3, states tend to import more from source states with straw purchaser liability and
those that require reporting of lost or stolen guns.
As an additional robustness check, we next estimate a ￿rst-di￿erenced speci￿cation. In
particular, we examine the di￿erence between trade ￿ows, for a given pair of states, from
source to destination and trade ￿ows from destination to source:
￿ = [ln(mds) ￿ ln(mdd)] ￿ [ln(msd) ￿ ln(mss)]
= ￿2￿(rs ￿ rd) + 2￿(Xs ￿ Xd) + 2(￿s ￿ ￿d) + (￿ds ￿ ￿dd) ￿ (￿sd ￿ ￿ss) (10)
As shown, distance, which is identical in the two equations, drops out of this ￿rst-di￿erenced
speci￿cation. More generally, any measure, whether observed or unobserved, that plays an
identical role in source-to-destination and destination-to-source observations, is di￿erenced
out in this speci￿cation. As shown in column 1 of Table 4, the results are broadly similar
to those in Table 2, with guns ￿owing from states with weak gun laws to states with strict
gun laws. The results are similar in column 2, with strict states both importing more
and exporting less. Finally, the results in column 3 are similar to those in the baseline
speci￿cation, although two additional laws, falsifying purchaser information liability and
local discretion to deny carry permits, now have a statistically signi￿cant e￿ect on trade
￿ows.
One potential alternative explanation for our baseline results involves interstate migra-
tion. While we have interpreted our baseline results as re￿ecting tra￿cking ￿ows, it is
14possible that these patterns in the data simply re￿ect population ￿ows. That is, if owners
of ￿rearms are moving from states with weak gun laws to states with strict gun laws, then
subsequent diversion of their guns to criminals, via theft, for example, could generate the
pattern of tracing observed in the data. To control for interstate migration, we use Census
data on 5-year migration rates reported in the American Community Survey between 2005
and 2009. In particular, we create a control variable in which we measure the number of
individuals moving from source to destination, relative to individuals who reported living in
the destination state in both the current period and ￿ve year prior.13 As shown in Table 5,
we indeed do ￿nd a positive correlation between gun tracing patterns and migration ￿ows,
suggesting that some of the out-of-state guns recovered may be due to migration. After
controlling for these ￿ows, however, the role of the gun laws is quite similar and, if anything,
suggests a stronger role for gun laws than does the baseline speci￿cation.
As an additional robustness check, we next present results using the tra￿cking index
reported by the Brady Campaign. As shown in Table 6, the results are broadly similar to
those in Table 2, with crime guns ￿owing from states with strict gun laws to states to weak
gun laws. As the index varies from a minimum value 0 to a maximum of 29, the coe￿cient
on the index is smaller, when compared to the coe￿cient in Table 2, which is based upon an
index that varies from 0 to 10. As reported in column 3, store security precautions, ballistic
￿ngerprinting, and mandatory reporting of lost ￿rearms have the expected negative e￿ect
on trade ￿ows. States that limit the purchase of handguns to one per month but with two
or more exceptions, by contrast, have an unexpected positive e￿ect on trade ￿ows.
A commonly noted problem associated with the multinomial logit model involves unre-
alistic substitution patterns, which follows from the assumption that the unobserved surplus
associated with tra￿cking ("tds) are independently distributed across source states.14 In
the context of our application and, as expressed in our baseline speci￿cation, an increase in
the stringency of gun laws in a given source state leads to an increase in trade ￿ows from
every other state that is proportional to the baseline level of imports. It might be more rea-
13 That is, letting fds denote the number of individuals moving from source to destination, the control
variable is measured as ln(fds) ￿ ln(fdd):
14 See Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
15sonable, by contrast, to allow for imports to increase in a disproportionate manner in states
that are similar, say in terms of geography, to the source state experiencing the increase in
the stringency in gun laws. To address this issue, we next estimate a nested logit model. In
this speci￿cation, we allow for ten nests: the domestic market and the nine Census regions,
excluding the destination state.15 Following Berry (1994), we estimate this speci￿cation by
controlling for the log of the within-group market share on the right-hand side. As shown
in Table 7, we do ￿nd evidence of a within-group correlation, as expressed in the positive
coe￿cient on the within-group share. After controlling for this within-group share, however,
the e￿ects of gun laws are broadly similar to those in our baseline speci￿cation.
Note that over 20 percent of observations involve zero trade ￿ows, and, given our log-
linear speci￿cation, these observations are not included in the baseline results. We have
attempted to address this issue in two ways. First, using our baseline speci￿cation in Table
2, we add one to all imports. The results from this speci￿cation, as shown in Table 8, are
similar to those in Table 2. Second, using our baseline speci￿cation in Table 2, we drop the
13 smallest states in terms of both imports and exports. These states account for over 80
percent of the zero trade ￿ows, and the remaining sample has only 5 percent of observations
involving zero trade ￿ows. As shown in Table 9, the results from this speci￿cation are similar
to those in Table 1.
To summarize, our baseline results are robust to the inclusion of destination state ￿xed
e￿ects, a ￿rst-di￿erenced speci￿cation, controls for interstate population migration, an al-
ternative index of state gun laws, a nested logit speci￿cation, and two methods for handling
the large number of zero trade ￿ows in our data.
6.2 Tra￿cking and Weakening of State Gun Laws
The baseline parameter estimates can be used to estimate the degree to which gun policies
are a￿ected by gun laws in other states. To shed light on this issue, we ￿rst conduct a
counterfactual experiment in which incentives for interstate gun tra￿cking are eliminated
in the sense that all source states adopt the gun laws in place in a given destination state.
15 We have also estimated models using the four Census divisions, rather than the nine Census regions,
and ￿nd broadly similar results.
16Under this counter-factual, we then calculate the degree to which states could change their
gun laws in order to match the real-world supply conditions. For states with strict gun laws,
this exercise ￿rst considers an inward shift in the supply curve associated with the reduction
of imports as all source states adopt the strict laws of the destination state, followed by
an equivalent outward shift in supply as regulatory policies are weakened in all states. By
shifting supply back to its original position, equilibrium prices and quantities are unchanged,
and this analysis is thus independent of the shape of the demand curve. For states with weak
gun laws, by contrast, this exercise ￿rst considers an outward shift in supply followed by an
inward shift as regulatory policies are strengthened.
More concretely, shutting down the stochastic components of the model and calculating
the gun laws in state d in the absence of incentives for tra￿cking (r0
d) that would match
observed supply, we have that
X
k
exp(￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿r0
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To get some intuition for this index, consider a special case. In particular, if transportation
costs, as measured by h(tdk); are very large for all source states k 6= d, then there are
no imports into state d, policies are neither weakened nor strengthened by tra￿cking, and
counterfactual policies are equal to actual policies (r0
d = rd): More generally, counterfactual
policies will be weaker than actual policies when a given destination state is exposed to
states with weak gun laws and stronger when exposed to states with strict gun laws.
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 10. The results suggest, for example,
that New Jersey could have an index of 8.2 were every other state to have the same gun
laws in place and still have the same criminal access to guns as they do when their actual
index equals 10 and when other states have much weaker gun laws. There are three broad
17patterns in these results. First, states with strict gun laws, such as New York and New
Jersey, tend to have their laws weakened by other states. By contrast, states with weak gun
laws, such as Texas and Arkansas, have their laws strengthened by states with stricter gun
laws. Second, spatial proximity to states with weak laws matters. Comparing two states
with similar laws, Utah and Indiana, for example, we have that laws are weakened in Utah,
which is surrounded by states with weak laws and strengthened in Indiana, which borders
two states, Illinois and Michigan, with relatively strict laws. Third, state size matters, with
small states being more a￿ected by tra￿cking. Indeed, the largest e￿ects are in the District
of Columbia, which has a very small population.
In summary, this supply-side empirical analysis provides support for the two predictions
of the model. That is, guns tend to ￿ow from states with weak gun laws to nearby states with
strict gun laws, and these results are robust to a number of alternative speci￿cations. Using
these parameter estimates, we then demonstrate that gun laws are signi￿cantly a￿ected by
inter-state tra￿cking, and any weakening of gun laws is particularly salient in states with
strict guns laws, those in close proximity to states with weak guns laws, and in smaller states.
7 Equilibrium Empirical Analysis
Building upon this analysis of the supply side, we next present two speci￿cations that also
account for the demand side. The ￿rst analysis assumes a ￿xed price, and the second analysis
allows for a general price elasticity of demand. These analyses have the bene￿t of allowing for
the computation of equilibrium criminal possession of guns under various counterfactuals.
But, as will be seen below, both of these analyses require additional assumptions from
both a speci￿cation and identi￿cation perspective and also require data on baseline criminal
possession of guns at the state level.
7.1 Fixed Price Analysis
Our ￿rst speci￿cation incorporates information on the demand side but makes the simplifying
assumption of a ￿xed price. That is, all criminals in state d are willing to pay price Pd; this
assumption is equivalent to assuming a perfectly elastic demand curve. While prices are
18assumed to be ￿xed under this assumption, quantities are determined in equilibrium and
are driven by the supply side.
Under this assumption and the parameterization of travel costs used above, we have that
the equilibrium probability that a tra￿cker purchases a gun in source state s and re-sells in
destination state d is given by:
Pr(gtd = s) =




exp(￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿rk + ￿Xk ￿ ￿1(tdk > 0) ￿ ￿tdk + ￿k)
(13)
Let ￿d0 denote the fraction of criminals not possessing a gun. Then, the number of criminals
not possessing a gun is given by md0 = [￿d0
P
k mdk]=(1 ￿ ￿d0), where
P
k mdk represents
the number of guns recovered in destination state d. Then, assuming a su￿ciently large
sample of recovered guns and recalling that the observed surplus from not tra￿cking a gun
is normalized to zero, we have the key estimating equation:
ln(mds) ￿ ln(md0) = ￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿rs + ￿Xs ￿ ￿1(tds > 0) ￿ ￿tds + ￿s + ￿ds (14)
By comparing imports from state s into destination state d to the decision to not tra￿c,
this speci￿cation now depends upon the price of a gun (Pd). Since this price is ￿xed by
assumption, however, it can be estimated by a destination state ￿xed e￿ect. This is helpful
since we do not have any data on prices in the secondary market. Also, the parameter ￿ is
identi￿ed in this estimation by comparing the number of guns imported from other states
to the number of guns purchased domestically.
As should be clear, this analysis requires state-level information on criminal possession
of guns. As a proxy, we incorporate FBI data on types of weapons used in robberies by state
during calendar year 2009. Averaging across states, around 40 percent of robberies involve
a gun, ranging from 19 percent in New Hampshire to 61 percent in Georgia.
A model justifying this proxy is one in which criminal decisions to commit robberies
are independent of gun possession, and criminals commit robberies with guns should they
possess a gun and with another weapon otherwise. Of course, there may be reasons to believe
that this is not the correct model of criminal behavior. Given the log-linear speci￿cation,
however, the key coe￿cients are unchanged under a model in which possession of a gun makes
19individuals more (or less) likely to commit a crime, and only the constant of the regression
is a￿ected.16 Thus, the analysis is robust to alternative models of criminal behavior.
Table 11 presents the results from this analysis. As shown, the inclusion of information
on criminal access to guns changes the results only slightly, with the parameter estimates in
column 1 similar to those in the baseline results in Table 2. In column 2, which relaxes the
assumption that every law in the index of 10 laws has the same e￿ect, the results are again
similar to those in Table 2.
Using these parameters, we next compute criminal possession of guns under a counter-
factual scenario in which incentives for tra￿cking are eliminated. In particular, we consider
a scenario in which domestic policies are ￿xed and are adopted in every other state as well.
For example, from the perspective of New York states, every state adopts 10 out of 10 gun
laws in the index, thereby eliminating incentives for tra￿ckers to travel to states with weak
gun laws in order to purchase guns. Under this counterfactual, we then re-compute criminal
possession of guns and compare this to the baseline criminal possession of guns, as predicted
by our model. As shown in Table 11, the e￿ects are again most signi￿cant in states with
strict guns laws, in close proximity to states with weak gun laws, and in small states. From
a proportional perspective, the largest declines are in DC, Rhode Island, and New Jersey.
Possession rates increase in states with weak gun laws, as disincentives for tra￿cking from
other states are eliminated. West Virginia, for example, has very weak gun laws and is sur-
rounded by states with stricter guns laws. Thus, criminal possession in this state increases
from 20 percent to 23 percent when all states adopt West Virginia’s gun laws.
7.2 Full equilibrium analysis
Finally, we present a speci￿cation in which we estimate both supply-side and demand-side
parameters. Importantly, this speci￿cation allows for the possibility that demand is perfectly
inelastic. In this special case, increasing the stringency of gun laws in other states will
increase prices but will not reduce equilibrium quantities even if tra￿cking ￿ows respond to
16 That is, assume that individuals commit robberies with probability Q if they possess a gun and with
probability q if they do not possess a gun. Then, the dependent variable in our regression will be ln(Qmds)￿
ln(qmd0). Separating Q and q and substituting in equation (14), we have ln(Qmds)￿ln(qmd0_ ) = ln(Q=q)+
ln(mds) ￿ ln(md0) = ln(Q=q) + ￿ + ￿Pd ￿ ￿rs + ￿Xs ￿ ￿1(tds > 0) ￿ ￿tds + ￿s + ￿ds:
20di￿erences in policies. Thus, in this special case, there are no cross-state externalities in the
sense that a weakening of gun laws in a given state does not increase criminal possession of
guns in other states.
In particular, we assume that, given a price Pd, criminal c in destination state d purchases
a gun with the following probability:
Pr(gcd = 1) =
exp(￿d ￿ ￿Pd)
1 + exp(￿d ￿ ￿Pd)
(15)
where ￿; which is hypothesized to be positive, captures the responsiveness of criminal pur-
chasing decisions to prices, and ￿d represents unobserved demand for guns in state d. Again,
if demand is perfectly inelastic (￿ = 0); then an increase in the stringency of gun laws may
increase prices but will not reduce possession rates.
For tractability considerations, we next assume that the number of criminals (n) is equal
to the number of tra￿ckers (N). In this case, equating supply, as expressed by the left-hand

















where ed = ￿ln
X
k
exp(￿￿rk ￿ h(tdk) + ￿Xk + ￿k + ￿dk) is an e￿ective stringency index of
the regulatory policy in d, accounting for both domestic and foreign gun laws.17 As shown,
a regression of possession rates on the e￿ective stringency index uncovers a combination of
demand-side (￿) and supply-side (￿) parameters. Under the hypotheses that ￿ > 0 and
￿ > 0; criminal possession of guns in equilibrium is declining in the e￿ective stringency
index.
To provide some interpretation for the e￿ective stringency index, consider ￿rst the special
case where h(tdk), which can be interpreted as the cost of importing from any state, is very
large and, shutting down the stochastic component, then the e￿ective index depends only
upon domestic policies and characteristics (i.e. ed = ￿rd ￿￿Xd) and there are no cross-state
17 To generate this speci￿cation, ￿rst note that equating aggregate supply and aggregate demand leads to
a closed-form solution for the equilibrium price [Pd =
￿d￿￿+ed
￿+￿ ]: Plugging this back into the demand equation
and re-arranging yields the equilibrium quantities.
21externalities. More generally, when transportation costs are low, this index will depend upon
both domestic and foreign policies, and an increase in the stringency of gun laws in a given
source state will have external e￿ects in the sense of reducing criminal possession rates in
other states.
In terms of empirical implementation, the key thing to note here is that the deterministic
component of this e￿ective stringency index ed can be computed with information on the
key parameters from our baseline supply side analysis, as reported in Table 2. That is,
shutting down the stochastic component, using the speci￿cation for transportation costs,




0) ￿ ￿tds + ￿Xk) and use this in a cross-state regression of possession rates on e￿ective
stringency indices.
Table 13 presents the results from this analysis, using the measure of criminal possession
of guns, as described above, based upon robbery data. As shown in column 1, which reports
the results from a 49-state OLS analysis, possession rates are declining in the stringency
index. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of an elastic demand curve and suggests
that state gun laws have externalities in the sense that an increase in the stringency of gun
laws in a given source state reduces criminal possession rates in other states, and especially
so in nearby states.
A key concern in interpreting this coe￿cient in column 1 involves policy endogeneity.
In particular, if unobserved criminal demand for guns among criminals (￿d) is correlated
with gun regulations (rd), then the estimates in column (1) will be biased. In terms of
the direction of any bias, however, one plausible scenario is that states in which criminal
possession is otherwise high will tend to enact strict gun laws to counteract this problem. In
this case, policy endogeneity would tend to move the coe￿cient on the stringency index in a
positive direction, and, if anything, this endogeneity will tend to understate the hypothesized
negative e￿ect of state gun laws on criminal possession rates.
To address this issue empirically, we next control for the domestic stringency index. That
is, we calculate the stringency index under the assumption of no-tra￿cking.18 Controlling
18 In particular, we calculate the domestic stringency index based solely upon domestic variables [i.e.,
b ed = ￿rd ￿ ￿Xd]:
22for this domestic stringency index, we then use the variation induced by laws in neighboring
states. Intuitively, we compare criminal possession rates in two states with similar laws
but with di￿erent laws in neighboring states. According to our hypothesis, possession rates
should be higher in the state surrounded by other states with weak gun laws. As shown in
the second column of Table 12, this is indeed the case. That is, after controlling for domestic
laws, the e￿ective stringency index has an even stronger e￿ect on criminal possession rates.
This suggests that the endogeneity on gun laws in the destination state is not driving our
results.
Using these parameter estimates, we next conduct counterfactual scenarios analogous to
those in Table 12. We ￿rst consider a counterfactual scenario in which gun laws are ￿xed
but in which incentives for tra￿cking of ￿rearms are eliminated.19 Table 14 reports the
results from this counterfactual. As shown, possession rates fall in states with strict gun
laws but increase in states with weak gun laws. The largest proportional declines are again
in states with weak gun laws, states surrounded by states with weak gun laws, and in small
population states. These include, for example, DC, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
To summarize, the results from this equilibrium empirical analysis suggest that gun laws
in other states in￿uence criminal possession of guns. While these analyses require additional
assumptions and the full equilibrium analysis is limited by its reliance on purely cross-
sectional data, the consistency of the results with the predictions of the theoretical model is
encouraging.
8 Time-to-Crime Analysis
While the tracing data are useful for detecting inter-state tra￿cking, they are necessarily an
indirect measure of tra￿cking. Given this, we follow the existing literature by also analyzing
an additional proxy for tra￿cking known as time-to-crime, de￿ned as the time elapsed





exp(￿￿rd ￿h(tdk)+￿Xk): Plugging this into the equation 16, we then compare these
counterfactual possession rates to the baseline predictions of the model.
23between the initial purchase of the gun and its recovery at a crime scene.20 In particular,
the literature has argued that guns with a short time-to-crime, typically measured as less
than two years, is a strong indicator of tra￿cking.
Following Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010), we correlate an index of gun laws with
the fraction of recovered guns by source state that have a time-to-crime of less than two
years. As shown in Figure 2, the fraction of recovered guns with a short time-to-crime varies
from under 10 percent from guns originally purchased in New Jersey to 40 percent for guns
originally purchased in Missouri.21 More importantly, there is a strong and statistically
signi￿cant correlation between gun laws and time-to-crime. In terms of the magnitude of
this e￿ect, these results suggest that states with the weakest laws have approximately 25
percent of guns with a short time-to-crime, whereas states with the strictest laws having
only 15 percent.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a theoretical and empirical analysis of cross-state exter-
nalities associated with state-level gun regulations. This analysis yields three key results.
First, tra￿cking ￿ows respond to gun regulations, with guns imported from states with
weak gun laws into states with strict gun laws. Thus, the necessary condition for cross-state
externalities is satis￿ed. The second key result is that proximity matters, with tra￿cking
￿ows more signi￿cant between two nearby states than between two distant states. Thus,
any externalities have a spatial component, with a weakening of gun laws having a more
signi￿cant e￿ect in nearby states. The third key result is that, consistent with the existence
of cross-state externalities, criminal possession rates tend to be higher in states exposed to
weak gun laws in other states.
These ￿ndings of cross-state externalities have a number of policy implications. First,
to the extent that states do not internalize these externalities when setting gun regulations,
gun policy may be too lax under decentralization. This idea is consistent with the standard
20 See, for example, Cook and Braga (1999) and Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010).
21 While these fractions may seem low at ￿rst glance, guns purchased in the last two years account for
only around 6 percent of all handguns in circulation (Cook and Braga, 2001).
24result of ine￿cient policies under decentralization and cross-state spillovers. Second, there
may be a role from a welfare perspective for increasing the stringency of federal regulations.
For example, federal laws equivalent to those in New York would eliminate incentives for
tra￿cking into this state. On the other hand, there would be a cost of further federal
interventions, as a key advantage of decentralization involves the ability of states to tailor
policies according to local preferences. While our analysis sheds light on this bene￿t of
greater centralization, weighing these bene￿ts and costs would require information on the
value of policies being tailored to local preferences under decentralization.
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TABLE 1B: GUN LAWS (BRADY CENTER INDEX)distance between ‐0.546*** ‐0.546*** ‐0.546***







log population difference 0.626*** 0.628*** 0.654***
(source less destination) (0.066) (0.066) (0.084)
log square miles difference 0.072 0.064 0.029
(source less destination) (0.094) (0.088) (0.092)




























































log population difference 1.180*** 1.180*** 1.193***
(source less destination) (0.075) (0.075) (0.086)
log square miles difference 0.063 0.063 ‐0.008
(source less destination) (0.098) (0.099) (0.112)






















R‐squared 0.685 0.685 0.743
TABLE 4: FIRST DIFFERENCE SPECIFICATION








log population difference 0.315*** 0.318*** 0.340***
(source less destination) (0.061) (0.063) (0.070)
log square miles difference 0.117 0.110 ‐0.065
(source less destination) (0.087) (0.081) (0.087)
migration flows 0.562*** 0.558*** 0.576***
(source to destination) (0.050) (0.049) (0.012)






















R‐squared 0.666 0.670 0.702
Standard errors (clustered at source and destination) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 1,861 observations
TABLE 5: CONTROLLING FOR INTERSTATE MIGRATIONdistance between ‐ 0.532*** ‐0.553*** ‐0.531***
source and destination (0.053) (0.049) (0.050)
log population difference 0.574*** 0.572*** 0.608***
(source less destination) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067)
log square miles difference 0.026 0.025 ‐0.065































R‐squared 0.419 0.434 0.477
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 1815 observations 
TABLE 6: BRADY CENTER STRINGENCY MEASURESdistance between ‐0.581*** ‐0.578*** ‐0.584***







log population difference 0.442*** 0.441*** 0.439***
(source less destination) (0.070) (0.072) (0.081)
log square miles difference 0.090 0.081 0.068
(source less destination) (0.110) (0.102) (0.107)
within group 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.538***
log market share (0.075) (0.070) (0.072)






















R‐squared 0.623 0.548 0.664
Standard errors (clustered at source and destination) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 1861 observations
TABLE 7: NESTED LOGIT SPECIFICATIONdistance between source ‐0.449*** ‐0.445*** ‐0.449***







log population difference 0.642*** 0.642*** 0.662***
(source less destination) (0.055) (0.055) (0.065)
log square miles difference 0.028 0.028 ‐0.001
(source less destination) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065)






















R‐squared 0.562 0.566 0.590
Standard errors (clustered at source and destination) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 2352 observations
TABLE 8: INCLUDING ZERO TRADE FLOWSdistance between ‐0.492*** ‐0.498*** ‐0.493***







log population difference 0.520*** 0.521*** 0.562***
(source less destination) (0.101) (0.103) (0.126)
log square miles difference ‐0.043 ‐0.046 ‐0.162***
(source less destination) (0.098) (0.096) (0.102)

































al 4 3.711 ‐0.289 nc 5 4.653 ‐0.347
ar 1 1.580 0.580 nd 2 2.545 0.545
az 0 0.401 0.401 ne 5 4.155 ‐0.845
ca 8 7.631 ‐0.396 nh 2 2.794 0.794
co 4 3.719 ‐0.281 nj 10 8.216 ‐1.784
ct 9 7.000 ‐2.000 nm 0 0.763 0.763
dc 9 5.006 ‐3.994 nv 0 0.677 0.677
de 5 4.290 ‐0.705 ny 10 8.896 ‐1.104
fl 2 2.110 0.112 oh 1 1.405 0.405
ga 2 2.199 0.199 ok 0 0.676 0.676
ia 7 5.494 ‐1.506 or 5 4.596 ‐0.404
id 0 0.860 0.860 pa 5 4.773 ‐0.227
il 8 6.909 ‐1.091 ri 7 5.300 ‐1.700
in 3 3.069 0.069 sc 2 2.333 0.333
ks 0 0.810 0.810 sd 0 1.334 1.334
ky 0 0.846 0.846 tn 2 2.268 0.268
la 0 0.636 0.636 tx 0 0.197 0.197
ma 9 7.544 ‐1.456 ut 3 2.973 ‐0.027
md 8 6.596 ‐1.404 va 4 3.890 ‐0.110
me 2 2.694 0.694 vt 1 2.517 1.517
mi 7 6.219 ‐0.781 wa 2 2.142 0.142
mn 5 4.560 ‐0.440 wi 2 2.302 0.302
mo 1 1.450 0.450 wv 0 1.330 1.330
ms 1 1.568 0.568 wy 2 2.474 0.474


















































al 0.339 0.332 ‐0.008 ‐0.023 nc 0.476 0.466 ‐0.009 ‐0.020
ar 0.465 0.485 0.020 0.043 nd 0.268 0.285 0.017 0.064
az 0.548 0.561 0.013 0.023 ne 0.342 0.318 ‐0.024 ‐0.070
ca 0.592 0.584 ‐0.008 ‐0.013 nh 0.195 0.217 0.021 0.108
co 0.419 0.411 ‐0.008 ‐0.019 nj 0.307 0.266 ‐0.040 ‐0.132
ct 0.300 0.253 ‐0.047 ‐0.156 nm 0.368 0.393 0.025 0.068
dc 0.243 0.165 ‐0.079 ‐0.324 nv 0.487 0.512 0.025 0.052
de 0.303 0.288 ‐0.015 ‐0.049 ny 0.394 0.368 ‐0.026 ‐0.067
fl 0.640 0.643 0.003 0.005 oh 0.398 0.411 0.013 0.032
ga 0.577 0.583 0.006 0.011 ok 0.420 0.442 0.022 0.052
ia 0.212 0.182 ‐0.030 ‐0.141 or 0.187 0.181 ‐0.006 ‐0.034
id 0.502 0.533 0.031 0.062 pa 0.364 0.359 ‐0.005 ‐0.013
il 0.430 0.400 ‐0.030 ‐0.069 ri 0.267 0.230 ‐0.037 ‐0.139
in 0.294 0.297 0.003 0.010 sc 0.443 0.455 0.012 0.027
ks 0.461 0.488 0.028 0.060 sd 0.289 0.331 0.042 0.145
ky 0.346 0.373 0.027 0.078 tn 0.560 0.569 0.009 0.016
la 0.396 0.416 0.020 0.050 tx 0.750 0.754 0.004 0.005
ma 0.296 0.264 ‐0.032 ‐0.109 ut 0.355 0.356 0.001 0.002
md 0.301 0.268 ‐0.033 ‐0.111 va 0.459 0.457 ‐0.002 ‐0.004
me 0.180 0.197 0.017 0.096 vt 0.382 0.440 0.058 0.152
mi 0.441 0.420 ‐0.021 ‐0.048 wa 0.422 0.427 0.005 0.012
mn 0.285 0.275 ‐0.010 ‐0.034 wi 0.470 0.480 0.011 0.023
mo 0.527 0.542 0.015 0.028 wv 0.197 0.230 0.033 0.168
ms 0.404 0.423 0.019 0.047 wy 0.466 0.485 0.019 0.041





























al 0.404 0.395 ‐0.008 ‐0.020 nc 0.419 0.409 ‐0.010 ‐0.024
ar 0.421 0.438 0.017 0.040 nd 0.294 0.307 0.014 0.046
az 0.481 0.493 0.012 0.025 ne 0.308 0.287 ‐0.021 ‐0.068
ca 0.372 0.417 ‐0.011 ‐0.025 nh 0.366 0.388 0.022 0.060
co 0.372 0.365 ‐0.008 ‐0.021 nj 0.343 0.297 ‐0.046 ‐ 0.134
ct 0.320 0.270 ‐0.049 ‐0.154 nm 0.388 0.410 0.022 0.056
dc 0.424 0.314 ‐0.110 ‐0.260  nv 0.396 0.416 0.020 0.049
de 0.359 0.340 ‐0.019 ‐0.053 ny 0.374 0.344 ‐0.030 ‐ 0.081
fl 0.542 0.545 0.003 0.006 oh 0.542 0.554 0.012 0.022
ga 0.496 0.502 0.006 0.012 ok 0.451 0.471 0.020 0.044
ia 0.314 0.277 ‐0.037 ‐0.119 or 0.313 0.303 ‐0.010 ‐0.0327
id 0.360 0.384 0.024 0.066 pa 0.443 0.436 ‐0.007 ‐0.015
il 0.451 0.476 ‐0.032 ‐ 0.064 ri 0.331 0.287 ‐0.043 ‐0.131
in 0.449 0.451 0.002 0.005 sc 0.439 0.448 0.010 0.022
ks 0.440 0.464 0.024 0.054 sd 0.342 0.379 0.037 0.107
ky 0.480 0.505 0.025 0.052 tn 0.462 0.470 0.008 0.017
la 0.476 0.495 0.019 0.040 tx 0.601 0.606 0.006 0.009
ma 0.335 0.297 ‐0.037 ‐ 0.112 ut 0.348 0.347 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 
md 0.355 0.318 ‐0.037 ‐ 0.105 va 0.431 0.428 ‐0.003 ‐0.007
me 0.326 0.344 0.184 0.056 vt 0.344 0.386 0.042 0.121
mi 0.366 0.345 ‐0.021 ‐0.058 wa 0.432 0.437 0.004 0.010
mn 0.359 0.347 ‐0.012 ‐0.033  wi 0.438 0.447 0.009 0.020
mo 0.472 0.485 0.134 0.028 wv 0.430 0.469 0.039 0.091
ms 0.433 0.450 0.017 0.038 wy 0.280 0.292 0.012 0.041
mt 0.303 0.322 0.019 0.062
TABLE 14: TRAFFICKING AND CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF GUNS, FULL EQUILIBRIUM SPECIFICATIONCategory Number of guns Percentage
Dangerous Drugs 25,673 10.72%
Weapons Offenses * 90,149 37.65%
Firearm Under Investigation 14,925 6.23%
Homicide 7,069 2.95%
Family Offense 4,588 1.92%
Found Firearm 20,975 8.76%
Health‐Safety 11,113 4.64%
Property Crimes (Robbery/Burglary) 6,231 2.60%
Assault 9,155 3.82%
Suicide 1,972 0.82%
Other 37,350 15.60%
None Provided 10,211 4.27%
* 63,326 of weapons offenses are possession crimes
APPENDIX TABLE 1: CRIME TYPES IN ATF TRACING DATA